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Abstract 
We study stock market reactions to large international military conflicts since World War II. Using a 
news analysis proxy for the estimated likelihood that a conflict will result in a war, we find that an 
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1. Introduction 
”Buy on the sound of the cannon, sell on the sound of the trumpet.“ is an old proverb from the Na-
poleonic wars, attributed to London financier Nathan Rothschild. It suggests that the start of a war is 
a good time to buy stocks, and that they should be sold once the war is over. The rationale behind 
this advice is that investors tend to overreact to the bad news of a coming war, leading to underpric-
ing, and that they overreact to the good news of the end of a war in a similar way, leading to over-
pricing. 
Economists have been concerned with the causes and consequences of international military crises 
for more than one hundred years, one of the first contributions being the work of Keynes (1919). 
Further work focused on the interplay between economy and war (Holsti and North (1966), Russett 
and Hanson (1975), and Collier and Hoeffler (1998)), as well as on the impact of war on financial 
markets throughout history (Frey and Kucher (2000)). 
Recently, the financial market reaction induced by international conflicts has received substantial 
interest in finance. News analysis has been used to reflect the perceived risks and consequences of 
wars. In an early pioneering study using content analysis of news, Holsti and North (1966) demon-
strate that security prices are related to rising international tensions during the outbreak of World 
War I. In a more general framework, Niederhoffer (1971) codes the headlines on world events on a 
seven-point good-bad scale in order to examine the impacts of news, and Cutler, Poterba, and Sum-
mers (1989) analyze the stock market reaction to world news (including wars) from 1926 to 1985. To 
quantify the effect of international conflicts on stock prices, Goldstein (1992) constructed a scale to 
code conflictive versus cooperative events that can be used to assess the impact of war risk, as it was 
pointed out by Schneider and Troeger (2006). There are further studies on the relation between 
world news and financial markets, in particular during times of crises: 
Elmendorf, Hirschfeld, and Weil (1996) study British bond market reactions to news by comparing 
weeks with important news to those without such news. Similarly, Rigobon, and Sack (2005) distin-
guish the days with war-related news to those without these news to measure the impact of war risk 
on financial markets. 
Whereas all of these studies either consider particular conflicts or the impact of war risk on financial 
markets during (at first glance) peaceful times, in this paper we want to focus on a slightly different 
aspect, namely wars with a “prologue“, i.e., wars which follow a period of tension. In this type of war 
we distinguish two phases: in the first phase, where cannons are still silent, there is an increasing 
danger of a war, possibly interrupted by times of hope for a peaceful resolution. Afterwards, in the 
second phase, the “sound of the cannon“ starts and war breaks out. 
The surprising finding of our analysis is that often the reaction of the stock market to the likelihood 
of a war is different between these two phases: whereas in the pre-war phase an increased likeli-
hood of war decreases market prices, the outbreak of the war itself, so to speak the increase of the 
likelihood from 99% to 10%, increases market prices. On the day of the outbreak of some specific 
war, news coverage is clearly focused on this particular event. The development of the stock market 
index then reflects the market’s reaction to and evaluation of the event, which is thus far from ran-
dom. 
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We observe this striking puzzle for a number of larger wars, including the Iraq War and World War II. 
In all cases we study the impact on the US stock market as measured by the S&P 500 or Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. To complement our results, we also analyze all other international crises with 
large impact since World War II, in particular wars that started unexpectedly, such as the Korean 
War. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses different proxies to estimate the likelihood of 
war. Section 3 analyzes the Iraq War in 2003 using different likelihood measurements and shows that 
a puzzle in the development of stock prices along the evolvement of this international crisis can be 
observed. Using further examples of international wars in Section 4, we show that this phenomenon 
does not seem to be restricted to the war in Iraq. Section 5 discusses possible explanations for the 
puzzle and rejects some – at first glance natural – explanations. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Estimating the likelihood of war 
To analyze market reactions to changes in war likelihood, we first need to find appropriate proxies 
for this likelihood. To this end, we analyze the Iraq War as several independent estimates for the 
probability of war are available here. This war then serves as a benchmark to establish a simple yet 
robust proxy using news that we can then readily apply to earlier wars where other data are not 
available. 
The Iraq crisis started to become serious on January 28, 2003 when President George W. Bush an-
nounced a possible attack on Iraq even in the absence of a UN resolution legitimating this course of 
action. After the ultimatum proposed to Saddam Hussein on March 17 to leave Iraq within 48 hours 
had expired, the first military intervention by the US started immediately in the early morning of 
March 20. Later that morning, President George Bush formally announced the Operation Iraqi Free-
dom. 
Following Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009), we use two independent estimates for the probability that a 
war would take place in Iraq: the first is the so-called “Saddameter“, an expert estimate for the likeli-
hood of an invasion of Iraq which was published on a daily basis by William Saletan on 
http://www.slate.com. This estimate provides us with data from November 2002 to March 18, 2003. 
The second is the so-called “Saddam Security“, a security that existed on the online exchange 
www.tradesports.com and which was designed to pay a certain amount if and only if Saddam Hus-
sein, president of Iraq, were still in power at a certain date. As a war was expected to end his rule 
over Iraq, Saddam Security prices gave a good probability estimate for the likelihood of war before 
the designated date (see Amihud and Wohl (2004)). This security was available with different maturi-
ty dates, where only March 2003 and June 2003 securities had a long enough price series. We use the 
June security, as the pattern of the March security is somehow obfuscated by the fact that even 
though the probability for a coming war increased, it was at times not at all clear whether the even-
tual war was over before the end of March. 
As another proxy we studied news data from the New York Times. We counted how many articles 
with the key words “war“ and “Iraq“ appeared in each day’s issue. To show that this variable is close-
ly related to the above mentioned probability measurements and that it provides the same qualita-
tive indications about the war likelihood, we regress each of the two measurements (i.e., the Sad-
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dameter and the Saddam Security) on our news proxy. The results are reported in Table 1. We see 
that the news variable is positively correlated with the Saddameter, that is, the expert measurement 
on the war likelihood and the number of (mostly negative) news items run in the same direction. The 
comovement between the Saddameter and the news variable between November 2002 and March 
2003 is depicted in Figure 1(a) and is negatively related to the development of the S&P 500. Similarly, 
the news proxy is positively related to the Saddam Security. 
<Table 1 about here> 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
3. The Iraq war puzzle 
As mentioned earlier, a puzzle can be observed when analyzing data of stock market prices prior to 
and at the onset of a war. The relation between stock market prices and the probability of an inter-
national conflict developing into a war is negative as long as the conflict is still evolving. However, it 
becomes positive at the actual onset of the war, thus a positive shock in the stock market can be 
observed when the war likelihood increases to 100%. In other words, an increasing war likelihood 
seems to decrease stock prices, while the outbreak of the war itself seems to increase them. This is 
what we call the “war puzzle“. 
To provide empirical evidence for this puzzle, we begin with an analysis of the Iraq War in 2003. The 
main reason for this approach is the fact that for this war we are able to use two alternative meas-
urements of the probability of war, namely the Saddameter and the news variable described in Sec-
tion 2. As previously explained, this has the advantage that we are able to conduct econometric anal-
yses for both types of probability measures in the same war. Hence, showing that the news variable 
is a valid proxy for war likelihood, we can then use this variable to analyze periods of war where no 
alternative probability measures are available. 
<Table 2 about here> 
<Table 3 about here> 
Analyzing the characteristics of the S&P 500, news, and the Saddameter, we find that these time-
series are non-stationary in levels, but stationary in first differences (see Table 2 for augmented Dick-
ey-Fuller test statistics for unit roots). Moreover, we find evidence for a cointegrating relationship 
between the S&P 500 and each probability measure of order one (see Table 3). This leads us to the 
choice of an error correction model to appropriately model the relation between the US stock mar-
ket and war likelihood. The econometric models employed to study the stock market in the pre-war 
phase are 
∆𝑆𝑃500𝑡−1 = 𝛽1∆𝑆𝑃500𝑡−2 + 𝛽2∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾[𝑆𝑃500𝑡−2 −∝0−∝1 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝑡  
∆𝑆𝑃500𝑡−1 = 𝛽1∆𝑆𝑃500𝑡−2 + 𝛽2∆𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛾[𝑆𝑃500𝑡−2 −∝0−∝1 𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝑡 
where ∆𝑆𝑃500 measures absolute daily changes in the S&P 500 and the error correction parameter 
𝛾 captures the degree to which deviations from an equilibrium in the previous period (captured by 
the error term) affect current values. Hence, 𝛾 is expected to be negative if a long run equilibrium 
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relationship prevails. Note that the functional form of most models used in this and the following 
sections is such that the explanatory variable is lagged forward relative to the dependent variable. 
While this may seem slightly counterintuitive at first sight, the reason is that there is a certain delay 
between the stock market pricing an event and its actual publication in the newspaper.1 
The estimated coefficients are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Both news and the Saddame-
ter are highly significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, and indeed indicate a negative relation-
ship between stock prices and war likelihood. An increase in the probability of war is thus associated 
with decreasing stock market prices.2 In particular, an increase in the difference of the number of 
news items, ∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡, by one unit leads to a decrease in the difference in the S&P 500, 𝑆𝑃500𝑡−1, by 
0.507 points. Similarly, an increase in the difference of the Saddameter value, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡−1, by one 
percentage point leads to a decrease in the difference in the S&P 500, ∆𝑆𝑃500𝑡−1 , by 1.112 points. 
The one day lag in the news variable can be attributed to the time required for physical publication of 
the newspaper. Since both probability measures yield the same implications, they may both be re-
garded as valid proxies, which ensures that we can employ the news variable as a valid proxy also in 
periods where alternative probability measures are not available. 
<Table 4 about here> 
To study the behavior of the stock market at the onset of the war, we conduct an analysis for struc-
tural breaks in the development of the stock market index. To this end, cumulative returns of the 
S&P 500 are regressed on a binary dummy 𝐷𝑡 defined as 
𝐷𝑡 = �0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 < ?̃?1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≥ ?̃? 
where ?̃? indicates a potential structural break, and a time window of size 51
3 around ?̃? is used to ob-
tain a set of models of type 
𝑆𝑃500𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 
That is, ?̃? is varied over time until the largest associated 𝑅2 is found, where we suppose that the ac-
tual onset of a war, and hence the observed structural break denoted by 𝑡0, lies in close proximity.
4 
Note that while we are aware of potential problems of non-stationarity in the cumulative returns, 
our analysis of structural breaks would not be feasible using first differences here. Our interest lies in 
potential increases in stock market values at the beginning of a war, which has to be separated from 
the question of average increases or changing trends. The problem thus is to weight an interesting 
question with the obvious problems of not using differences in the model in order to resolve the 
issue. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 1(b). The largest 𝑅2 obtained amounts to 0.7665 and is associated 
with March 18, 2003 while on March 20, 2003, the invasion of Iraq took place (𝑅2 = 0.6898). Hence, 
the true structural break can be relatively well predicted.5 The S&P 500 increases by 46.4 points at 
the time of the predicted structural break and by 47.8 points at the time of the invasion two days 
later. Although it may prove difficult to interpret this absolute change in the stock market index at 
the onset of the war and compare it across conflicts, we refrain from calculating relative changes, for 
instance. As the volume of news items clearly differs over time, a comparison of relative values over 
time would be meaningless and thus reveal no further insights for the analysis. 
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4. The war puzzle – a general phenomenon 
The results of the previous section could either be a general phenomenon or just an idiosyncrasy of 
the Iraq War. In this section we therefore extend the analysis to other wars with large international 
impact since World War II. We face two problems here: first, we need to decide which wars to in-
clude, and second, the number of large scale wars during this time was – fortunately – not big 
enough to use a single econometric approach for all wars. Instead of performing a unified analysis, 
we are forced to study the conflicts separately. As any event study involving data on stock market 
indices during international military conflicts, our subsequent analysis is necessarily based on a small 
number of observations. 
We solve the above-mentioned selection problem by using the list of the most costly wars to the US 
(and thus arguably to the US economy) as composed by Stephen Daggett6 (see Table 5). In the fol-
lowing we will study each of the wars from this list, where we distinguish between wars with a sur-
prising start and wars with a longer prelude. Since the wars took place at very different times, with 
news traveling at different speeds, the econometric models we apply necessarily differ in details. 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
4.1 World War II (1939-45) 
To analyze World War II, two starting dates can be studied: on the one hand, the German invasion of 
Poland on September 1, 1939, and on the other, the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, dragging the US into the war. 
We first study the former event as it had a large prelude while we will study the latter rather surpris-
ing one in Section 4.6. To analyze it in an econometric setting, a first differences approach of the 
form 
∆𝐷𝐽𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐷𝐽𝐼𝑡−2 + 𝛽2∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝛽3∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
is most appropriate. The stock market is described by absolute daily changes in the Dow Jones Index, 
∆𝐷𝐽𝐼, and the war likelihood is from now on captured by the news proxy as established in Section 2, 
i.e. in this case the number of articles in the New York Times featuring the key words ”war“ and “Po-
land“. Figure 2(a) depicts the relation between the Dow Jones Index and the probability of war be-
tween June and September 1939. Column 3 of Table 4 shows the regression results obtained from 
estimating this equation. The marginal effect of the news variable is significantly negative for all dif-
ferent lags ∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡−1, ∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡, and ∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡+1 ranges from -0.195 (∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡−1) to -0.284 (∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡) 
points. Figure 2(b) illustrates the results obtained from the structural break analysis of type 
𝐷𝐽𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 
September 5, 1939 is identified as the most likely structural break in the data set (𝑅2 = 0.8274). In 
fact, this lies close to the German attack of Poland being the critical event on September 1, 1939 
(𝑅2 = 0.7244). The time lag may be explained by the slower speed of news publication at that time. 
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<Figure 2 about here> 
 
4.2 Vietnam War (1955-75) 
The Vietnam War distinguishes itself from other wars by the fact that its time line is less clear, but 
the onset of the large scale US involvement is set in 1965. The development of the Dow Jones Index 
and the news variable between February 1964 and March 1965 is depicted in Figure 3(a). 
<Figure 3 about here> 
The most suitable model for this war is a time-series approach of type 
∆𝐷𝐽𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐷𝐽𝐼𝑡−2 + 𝛽2∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 . 
The regression results for this model are presented in column 4 of Table 4. Again, we see a significant 
negative relation between the war likelihood and the development of stock prices. Figure 3(b) illus-
trates the results for the analysis of structural breaks. We see that the ad hoc regression identifies 
April 15, 1965 as the event associated with the largest coefficient of determination, 𝑅2 = 0.7860. In 
fact, one critical event coincides with this date: it marks the first US and South Vietnamese bombing 
of Viet Cong positions. The jump in cumulative returns is significantly positive at the 1% level and 
amounts to an increase in the Dow Jones Index by 28.01 points. 
Note that, for the war in Vietnam, the analysis does not exactly describe the pre-war period and the 
distinct outbreak of the war itself, but nevertheless proves to be a useful method to analyze the reac-
tion of cumulative stock returns to war news within a prolonged period of tensions. 
 
4.3 Gulf War (1990-91) 
The Gulf War7 started with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990 and ended with the de-
feat of Iraq by the US and their allies on February 28, 1991. The relevant date for our analysis is Janu-
ary 17, 1991 when the Operation Desert Storm (with the goal of liberating Kuwait) was started by 
massive aerial bombing. The Gulf War moved into its second and much larger phase then. As such, 
our news series covers the time span up to this date, which can be interpreted as a pre-war phase 
from the perspective of the US and their allies. 
Analyzing this relation with a time-series approach, column 5 of Table 4 shows the results. We see 
once more that there is empirical evidence for a significant negative relation between news and 
stock market prices. The analysis for structural breaks in the development of cumulative returns (see 
Figure 4) identifies February 4, 1991 as the break point (𝑅2 = 0.8457) which, however, lies some 
days after the initial aerial bombing. In fact, the closest real event to this indication is the Battle of 
Khafji being the first major ground battle in the Gulf War on January 29, 1991. 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
4.4 Afghanistan (2001) 
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In contrast to the conflicts analyzed in the previous sections, the Afghanistan war, starting in October 
2001, had too short a prelude (beginning only after Afghanistan’s involvement in the attack on Sep-
tember 11, 2001 became clear) to be analyzed in an econometric setting. However, we can still per-
form an analysis for structural breaks and show that there exists an increase in stock market prices at 
the onset of the war. Figure 5(a) depicts the development of the S&P 500 and news between Sep-
tember and October 2001. Figure 5(b) shows the empirical results from the analysis for structural 
breaks. Again, an increase in the S&P 500 around the time of the start of the war can be identified. 
<Figure 5 about here> 
 
4.5 Behavior of other large stock market indices 
Do stock markets in other countries behave similarly to the US market? For the two recent wars with 
a sufficiently long prelude, i.e. the Gulf War and the Iraq War, Figure 6 shows that Japanese, German, 
and European stock indices mirror the development of the S&P 500 quite well. The analysis for struc-
tural breaks (see Table 6) shows particularly for the Gulf War simultaneous up-moves at the onsets of 
war.8 The fact that the US, Europe and Japan are strongly interconnected in economic terms may 
further account for the clear comovement of Nikkei, DAX, and Eurostoxx which can be observed dur-
ing these two wars in the Middle East. A similar, though less pronounced, comovement also exists for 
the Afghanistan War.9 
<Figure 6 about here> 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
4.6 Wars “out of the blue“ 
So far we have analyzed wars that had a more or less pronounced prelude. However, there are also 
some wars with a very fast and unexpected onset.10 Most notably, these are: 
• the start of the involvement of the United States in World War II (Pearl Harbor) on December 
7, 1941, 
• the Korean War, which started with the rather unexpected invasion of South Korea by North 
Korea on June 25, 1950, 
• and finally the Gulf War, or more precisely, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990. 
Pearl Harbor can indeed be interpreted as a surprising conflict. Although U.S. relations with Japan 
were deteriorating in 1941, the actual start of the war came as a surprise: a representative survey by 
Gallup conducted a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that only 52% of Americans 
actually expected “that the United States will go to war against Japan some time in the near future” 
(Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (1941)). What happened was that, not “some time in the near 
future”, but just a few days later, the war started – and not by the US going to war, but by the US 
being attacked. This is in stark contrast to the situation, e.g., in the Iraq War where the likelihood of a 
war was already estimated to be above 90% several weeks before the start of the war (see Figure 1 
(a)). 
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In all of these cases we cannot expect to find the same pattern which we observed before the out-
break of the wars analyzed in the previous section. There is simply no pre-war phase that could be 
analyzed and where an increase in the probability of war could decrease stock market prices.11 
What we can observe, however, is whether the onset of a war led to a sudden increase or decrease 
in stock market prices. A structural break analysis shows that this is indeed the case for all three 
wars. However, the pattern is inverted: in all three cases, stock market prices went down significantly 
at the outbreak of the war. In the case of Pearl Harbor, the Dow Jones Index went down by nearly 3% 
in one day, in the case of the Korean War by nearly 5%, and in the case of the Gulf War it went down 
by around 5.7% within a week. 
 
4.7 What’s puzzling about the war puzzle 
Our analysis so far has revealed quite a peculiar pattern: on the one hand, stock prices tend to fall 
when the probability of a war increases and tend to rise when there are signs for a peaceful resolu-
tion. However, the actual onset of the war will increase stock market prices. 
While this by itself is already puzzling, it becomes even more puzzling considering the evidence that 
we found about surprising wars (wars without a lengthy prelude): here, we observe that stock mar-
ket prices tend to decrease once the war breaks out. In other words, whether stock prices decrease 
or increase when a war breaks out does not seem to depend much on the particular war but more on 
the previous history or, more precisely, whether the war was surprising or not. But even this obser-
vation cannot explain the discrepancy that one and the same war first suggests a pattern that an 
increase in the likelihood of war decreases stock market prices but then ultimately the onset of the 
war itself increases them. This cannot easily be accommodated with the idea that stock market prices 
reflect expectations of the future economic development of a country. 
Table 7 summarizes the stock markets’ different reactions towards news for all conflicts studied. 
<Table 7 about here> 
 
5. Attempts to explain the puzzle 
5.1 War as a stimulus package for the US economy 
The first idea about this puzzle might be that it is none: a war can be considered as a stimulus pack-
age for the US economy and thus lead to an increase in stock market prices. 
However, this line of argument does not work for two reasons: first, Section 4.5 showed that the 
puzzle also seems to be present for countries which were not involved in the respective war, such as, 
for instance, Germany in the Iraq War. Second, the explanation fails to explain why before the war, 
prices fall whenever the war becomes more likely. 
Falling prices when war is looming and rising prices when war is starting: only the combination of 
these two observations makes the war puzzle a puzzle. 
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5.2 Expectations about a quick end of the war 
A natural idea is to consider the time dimension (Schneider and Troeger (2006)): once the war breaks 
out, it is clear that the trouble will be over soon, thus investors buy stocks again. For example, the 
Saddam Security can be interpreted as the likelihood of a coming war, but also as expected length of 
the war (Amihud and Wohl (2004) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009)). Chappell and Eldridge (2000) 
also suggested psychological explanations such as “despair“ and “renewed hope“, regarding the UK 
stock index reactions to the two sub-periods during World War II. There are, however, at least three 
arguments that lead us to discard this natural looking idea to explain our findings as well: 
• Since the Saddam Security works well as a proxy for the estimated probability of war, it is 
clear that investors did not expect the war to take place in the distant future: recall that the 
particular security that we studied would only pay out if Saddam Hussein was out of power 
by June – not long after the war indeed took place! 
• While the positive expectation of a quick war that ends the costly and lengthy tensions be-
fore might be true, e.g., for the war in Iraq (although with hindsight it turned out to be overly 
optimistic), this cannot explain the pattern observed at the onset of World War II; given that 
it was generally not expected that this war would end quickly, given the experience of the 
four year long World War I. 
• The expectation of a quick end to the war cannot explain why investors do not seem to ap-
preciate the increase of the likelihood of a coming war earlier, as this brings the war (and 
hence its end) closer. 
 
5.3 Expectations about a devastating outcome of the war 
For the Iraq War, another explanation for the fact that stock prices increased while the war took its 
course is that, in this case, everybody was afraid of a truly devastating outcome by means of weap-
ons of mass destruction. As it turned out that this did not happen, stock prices eventually increased. 
However, this reasoning is neither able to explain why stock prices increased already at the very start 
of the war – and not a bit later while Saddam Hussein still had time to use weapons of mass destruc-
tion if he had them –, nor can it explain why the same pattern is observed in World War II, for in-
stance, where this argument fails to be applicable. 
 
5.4 The role of the US within each conflict 
There exists a large body of literature on the structure of conflicts from a political perspective. The 
basic modeling idea is that an aggressor makes an initial surprising move towards his opponent, who 
then reacts as a defender. Both aggressor and defender can have allies to their aid. 
One of the most influential publications within this literature is Schelling (1966). Against the back-
ground of the potential use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, he argues that the purpose of 
military strategy became intrinsically based on deterrence rather than ultimate victory over the op-
ponent. Deterrence can thus be interpreted as bargaining power to coerce the opponent to behave 
in a particular way. While the author argues that this power is most successful when it is not actually 
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performed, but rather used as a threat, he also notes that, in reality, this bargaining power is often 
conveyed by some performance of it. War is thus interpreted as a particular type of bargaining pro-
cess. Other authors argue that war itself is a sign of the previous breakdown of the peaceful bargain-
ing process (see Powell (2002)). 
In this paper, we use a data set on US news items and stock prices. An obvious question to ask is thus 
which role the US played in each of the conflicts analyzed and to what extent this may have an im-
pact on our results. 
While there is no obvious relation between a possible aim of deterrence on the part of the US and 
the development of stock prices, a closer look at the overall position of the US reveals an interesting 
pattern: the US played an active role in the Vietnam War and the Gulf War (as ally to the defender) 
and in the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War (as main attacker). In all of these conflicts, stock prices 
increased at the onset of the war. At first sight, one may argue that it is the active role of the US 
which influenced the positive development of stock market prices. However, all of these wars did 
also have a preceding period of increased tension which makes it difficult to disentangle US participa-
tion and pre-war phases as possible causes for the direction of stock market developments. This ar-
gument can be supported by looking at all unexpected conflicts, namely Pearl Harbor, the invasion of 
South Korea by North Korea and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The US was the attacked country in 
the case of Pearl Harbor, and an ally to the defender in the Korean War as well as the Gulf War. In all 
three cases, the US had not yet assumed an active role within the conflict when stock prices started 
to decrease. The same problem arises again: we cannot say whether it is the type of role that the US 
assumed or the character of the crisis that influences the direction of stock price developments. 
However, there is one exception: when stock prices began to increase at the onset of World War II in 
September 1939, the US had not yet assumed an active role, either. This can be interpreted as an 
indication towards the presence of the war puzzle, i.e. it is the structure of the conflict that matters 
for stock markets, and not the military position or the goals of the US. But even if the driving force 
behind increasing stock prizes at the onset of a war is the participation of the US, this does not re-
solve the “war puzzle“, but rather raises the new question of how the active role of the US influences 
the stock market. 
Also note that one might argue that the fact that catastrophic outcomes were unlikely for the US 
during World War II contradicts the fact that Germany proceeded with comprehensive propaganda 
related to weapons of mass destruction. Their use did eventually not materialize. This seeming con-
tradiction can be resolved by the interpretation of German propaganda as a non-plausible threat to 
the US. It may also be regarded as a deterrence toward the US (see Schelling (1966)). In particular, 
propaganda may have been used as a bargaining power to prevent the US from intervening. 
 
5.5 Ambiguity averse investors 
An alternative explanation that seems to be natural is to assume that investors show ambiguity aver-
sion. At first the ambiguity about the probability of a war breaking out makes people shy away from 
the stock market and hence leads to lower stock prices. This effect stops as soon as it becomes clear 
that a war is indeed starting for sure and uncertainty is reduced (Schneider and Troeger (2006)). 
Guidolin and LaFerrara (2010) suggest that the initiation of conflict can been seen as a sign of resolve 
and investors tend to show positive reactions by buying stocks. 
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However, this seemingly natural behavioral explanation cannot accommodate our empirical data, as 
ambiguity cannot make an ambiguous situation seem worse than its worst possible outcome. In this 
situation, that would mean that, even though the probability of the start of a war is uncertain and 
hence ambiguous, an ambiguity-averse investor would still prefer this situation over a situation 
where the war has started for sure. 
 
5.6 Uncertainty about investment decisions 
Another idea to resolve the puzzle is to consider the uncertainty about a war as an uncertainty about 
the decision between different portfolio allocations: in the case of a peaceful resolution an investor 
should have invested in different assets than in the case of a war. While it is uncertain which of the 
two outcomes will occur, it might be optimal for an investor to stay out of the stock market entirely, 
or at least to reduce their holdings substantially. 
To study this idea more in detail, we describe a small model. 
When facing the possibility of the outbreak of a war, an investor has to decide between investing in 
two different portfolios, a “war portfolio“ that will be successful if a war breaks out, and a “peace 
portfolio“ that will be successful if the conflict ends in a peaceful resolution. We summarize the four 
potential outcomes in the following table12: 
 war  breaks out  
(probability 𝒑) 
peaceful resolution  
(probability 𝟏 − 𝒑) 
war portfolio 𝑎 −𝑏 
peace portfolio −𝑐 1 
 
Assuming that it is in any case bad for the investor to speculate on the wrong outcome, we have 
𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ≥ 0. The expected payoff of the investor now depends on his portfolio decision. If he decides 
on the war portfolio, it is 𝑎𝑝 − 𝑏(1 − 𝑝). If he decides instead on the peace portfolio, it is (1 − 𝑝) −
𝑐𝑝 (see Figure 7). Obviously, the war portfolio is better for large values of 𝑝 and worse for small val-
ues. As a short computation shows, the cut-off point is at  
𝑝∗ = 1+𝑏
1+𝑎+𝑏+𝑐
. 
<Figure 7 about here> 
This model indeed predicts the observed pattern: an increase in 𝑝 makes the peace portfolio less and 
less attractive. Consequently, investors will sell the corresponding stocks. At the same time, however, 
the war portfolio is still even less attractive, thus the falling prices of the peace portfolio stocks can 
not be matched by rising prices of stocks in the war portfolio. Once the probability of war reaches 𝑝∗, 
the pattern changes: now, war stocks become more and more attractive, thus investors buy them 
and the overall market starts to rise. 
In order to find a probability 𝑝∗ that is close to one and thus in line with our empirical evidence, 
𝑏 needs to be sufficiently large, thus the potential loss when choosing a war portfolio, but encounter-
ing a peaceful resolution, should be fairly large. 
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Theoretically, we can explain the puzzle in this way, but how is it in reality? 
How can we test empirically whether this model indeed explains the war puzzle? The general idea is 
that different stocks should show a different pattern during the different phases before an outbreak 
of the war: stocks that are in the “peace portfolio“, i.e. stocks that would benefit from a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, should initially be sold whenever the likelihood of a war increases. Thus we 
would expect them to follow the generally observed pattern of the stock market, but only before the 
outbreak of the war: at that point these stocks should not increase significantly, as there is no reason 
for investors to purchase them once it is clear that the “war portfolio“ is the right investment. 
Stocks in the “war portfolio“ instead should follow the increase of the stock market at the start of the 
war, but not its previous decrease whenever the war became more likely. 
A simple empirical test is now possible by looking at differences between sectors that should clearly 
be in the war portfolio (weapon-related industry) and sectors that should clearly be in the peace 
portfolio (e.g., travel-related industry). It turns out, however, that as convincing as the theoretical 
idea is, it thoroughly fails this simple but clear-cut test: in fact, whereas sectors that one would un-
doubtedly assign to the peace portfolio (e.g., travel stocks, like airlines) increased most at the out-
break of the war, stocks in the war portfolio (weapon manufacturers) did not. 
To sum up, this explanation looks good in theory, but unfortunately does not help to resolve the puz-
zle in reality. 
 
5.7 Mean-variance preferences 
Finally there is a rather unexpected possible explanation for the phenomenon: classical mean-
variance preferences. Indeed, this concept could explain the observed data surprisingly well. One 
could argue that people do not buy when it is unsure what is going to happen due to their variance 
aversion, even though the expected return might still be a little bit better than when the war has 
finally started. In this sense the observed phenomenon could be related to the mean-variance para-
dox. 
To formalize this idea, we assign average expected returns 𝜇𝑊 and 𝜇𝑃 to the two potential outcomes 
(war and peace). We denote the probability of a war by 𝑝, and compute the variance of the two-
outcome lottery (𝜇𝑊 with probability 𝑝 and 𝜇𝑃 with probability 1 − 𝑝 ) as  
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑝(𝜇𝑃 − 𝜇𝑊)2. 
The variance is zero for 𝑝 = 0 (i.e. peace is sure) or 𝑝 = 1 (i.e. war is sure) and maximal for 𝑝 = 1/2 
(see Figure 8). 
<Figure 8 about here> 
Typical indifference curves for a mean-variance investor with utility 𝜇 − 𝛼𝜎2 are also shown in Figure 
8. Looking at the indifference curve through the point (0, 𝜇𝑊) (i.e. a certain war) we see that this 
investor would prefer a certain war (𝑝 = 1) over a situation where 𝑝 is large, but still smaller than 
one. 
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When the probability 𝑝 increases from zero to one, at first the situation worsens for the investor 
(who consequently would value stocks less), but after a certain point (in our model at 𝑝∗ =(∝ −1)/∝, as a short computation shows) there is indeed a perceived improvement for the investor, 
explaining the increase in stock prices at the outbreak of a war. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have observed that stock market prices react very sensitively to the probability of the outbreak 
of a major war. The pattern that was shown for several wars during the last century demonstrates 
that an increase in the likelihood of war decreases stock prices and vice versa. What is puzzling, how-
ever, is that once a war breaks out, stock market prices do not decrease further, but do the very op-
posite and increase significantly. This was true for all wars with a more or less lengthy prologue. Wars 
that occur “out of the blue“ show a different pattern in that their sudden outbreak tends to decrease 
stock market prices. These results are certainly a challenge for classical asset pricing models. 
Mean-variance preferences of investors might be able to explain the observed pattern. There could, 
however, be different explanations for this puzzle based on other behavioral factors. Future re-
search, e.g. with the help of laboratory experiments, might be able to shed more light on this puzzle. 
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Appendix 
Tables 
 Saddam Security June Iraq war news 
Saddameter 𝜌 = 0.86 𝜌 = 0.66 
 𝑁 = 56 𝑁 = 81 
Saddam Security June  𝜌 = 0.64 
  𝑁 = 78 
Table 1: Correlations between different proxies for the probability of war. All correlations are signifi-
cant at the 1% level and use the largest available number of days from the discussed time series. 
 
  intercept intercept and trend 
levels SP500 -1.5167 -2.5662 
 news 0.1771 -7.0122*** 
 Saddameter -0.5129 -1.8901 
first differences SP500 -9.6884*** -9.6221*** 
 news -7.7683*** -7.8207*** 
 Saddameter -7.8386*** -7.7840*** 
Table 2: Iraq War: ADF test statistics for unit roots. 
 
  intercept intercept and trend 
levels 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡  -3.0972** -5.4364*** 
 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 -3.8389*** -3.7985** 
first differences 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡  -13.2052*** -13.1416*** 
 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑆𝑃500𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 -9.2592*** -9.2003*** 
Table 3: Iraq War cointegration tests: ADF test statistics for unit roots in residuals 𝜀𝑡. 
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war 
method 
likelihood proxy 
Iraq 
ECM 
news 
Iraq 
ECM 
Saddameter 
WWII 
first differences 
news 
Vietnam 
first differences 
news 
Gulf War 
first differences 
news 
∆𝒏𝒆𝒘𝒔𝒕−𝟏   -0.1946** -0.1160*** -0.2207 
   (0.0741) (0.0384) (0.1324) 
∆𝒏𝒆𝒘𝒔𝒕 -0.5072***  -0.2844*** -0.0456 -0.2885** 
 (0.1835)  (0.0863) (0.0384) (0.1281) 
∆𝒏𝒆𝒘𝒔𝒕+𝟏   -0.2651***   
   (0.0697)   
𝒏𝒆𝒘𝒔𝒕−𝟏 -3.6611***     
 (0.5644)     
∆𝑺𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒕−𝟏  -1.1147**    
  (0.4927)    
𝑺𝒂𝒅𝒅𝒕−𝟏  -2.3051***    
  (0.1892)    
∆𝑺𝑷𝟓𝟎𝟎𝒕−𝟐 -0.0530 0.0512   0.1588 
 (0.1104) (0.1110)   (0.1170) 
∆𝑫𝑱𝑰𝒕−𝟐   -0.0004 0.1519***  
   (0.1181) (0.0553)  
𝜸 -0.2274*** -0.3940***    
 (0.0681) (0.1020)    
𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕   0.1827 0.2032 0.1788 
   (0.1859) (0.1609) (0.3735) 
𝑹𝟐 0.1680 0.2767 0.2276 0.0510 0.1098 
𝑵 78 78 69 311 72 
From Nov 21, 2002 Nov 21, 2002 May 25, 1939 May 6, 1964 Oct 10, 1990 
to March 18, 2003 March 18, 2003 Aug 31, 1939 March 12, 1965 Jan 1, 1991 
Table 4: Regression results for the effect of the war likelihood on stock prices. Standard errors are 
given in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% level. 
 
 costs in billion 2008 US$ % of GDP 
World War II 4114 35.8 
Korean War 320 4.2 
Vietnam War 686 2.3 
Gulf War 96 0.3 
Iraq War 648 1.0 
Afghanistan War 171 0.3 
Table 5: List of the most costly wars to the US (source: Stephen Daggett, CRS Report for Congress, 
costs of major U.S. wars, July 2008). 
 
 critical event estimated breaks 
  S&P 500, DJI Nikkei DAX Eurostoxx 
Iraq War Mar 20, 2003 Mar 18, 2003 Mar 7, 2003 Apr 7, 2003 Feb 25, 2003 
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Gulf War Jan 29, 1991 Feb 4, 1991 Feb 5, 1991 Jan 30, 1991 N/A 
Table 6: Analyses for structural breaks in other large stock market indices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 stock market reaction to: 
 increasing prob. expected start surprising start 
 0%-99% 99%-100% 0%-100% 
WWII (start in Europe) ↘ ↗  
WWII (Pearl Harbor)   ↘ 
Korean War   ↘ 
Vietnam War ↘ ↗  
Gulf War (Kuwait invasion)   ↘ 
Gulf War (“desert storm“) ↘ ↗  
Afghanistan War * ↗  
Iraq War (2003)         ↘ ↗  
Table 7: Summary of stock markets’ reactions to news. * indicates a lack of data in order to investi-
gate this point. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1a and 1b: Probability of a war./Structural break analysis. Development of the S&P 500 at the 
beginning of the Iraq War. The largest local 𝑅2 was reached for ?̃? = March 18, 2003 while the inva-
sion of Iraq took place two days later on March 20, 2003. 
 
 
Figure 2a and 2b: Probability of a war./Structural break analysis. Development of the Dow Jones In-
dex at the beginning of World War II. The largest local 𝑅2 was reached for ?̃? = September 5, 1939 
while the German attack of Poland took place on September 1, 1939. 
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Figure 3a and 3b: Probability of a war./Structural break analysis. Development of the Dow Jones In-
dex during the Vietnam War. The largest local 𝑅2 was reached for ?̃? = April 15, 1965 which coincides 
with the first US and South Vietnamese bombing of Viet Cong positions on that day. 
 
 
Figure 4: Development of the S&P 500 and explanatory power of structural break analysis at the be-
ginning of the Gulf War. The largest local 𝑅2 was reached ?̃? = February 4, 1991 while the Battle of 
Khafji took place on January 29, 1991. 
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Figure 5a and 5b: Probability of a war./Structural break analysis. Development of the S&P 500 during 
the Afghanistan War. The largest local 𝑅2 was reached for ?̃? = October 12, 2001 while the air attack 
took place on October 7, 2001. 
 
 
Figure 6a and 6b: Gulf War./Iraq War. Comovement of other stock market indices. For the sake of 
comparability, the data series of Nikkei, DAX, and Eurostoxx are linearly transformed such that all 
series have a mean equal to the mean of the S&P 500. 
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Figure 7: Investors switching from a “peace portfolio“ to a “war portfolio“ when the probability of 
war increases beyond a threshold 𝑝∗could explain the war puzzle. 
 
 
Figure 8: Mean-variance preferences can explain the war puzzle. Here, Pµ and Wµ are the returns in 
case of peace and war, respectively. 𝜎 is the variance of the situation, depending on the probability 
of war. It is maximal when the probability is 1/2 (maximal degree of uncertainty). The dashed lines 
are indifference curves, i.e. they mark combinations of mean and variance on which an investor 
would be indifferent. A certain war is preferred over an uncertain situation with a high probability of 
war (points on the thick line). 
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1 Standard predictive models are often constructed such that changes in variables at time 𝑡 + 1 are explained 
by changes in variables at time 𝑡. In our case this approach would require to use a variable for the war likeli-
hood which realizes prior to actual changes in the stock market. However, since our argument is to use the 
news proxy as a flexible probability measurement which is available for different wars over time, the functional 
forms used here slightly differ from standard models due to the delay of news publication. This however does 
not alter the models’ predictive power. 
2 Also, the error correction parameter 𝛾 is significantly negative as expected for both types of probability 
measurements. 
3 That is, the data set ranges from ?̃? − 25 to ?̃? + 25 days around ?̃?. 
4 We use this type of structural break analysis since we are interested in whether there exists an instantaneous 
jump in the stock market index at the onset of a war. An alternative question would be whether there are pos-
sible changes in the trend of the stock market. For that purpose a model testing for changes in expected 
growth rates of stock returns may be appropriate (see Amihud and Wohl (2004)). 
5 Note that the estimated structural break on March 18 coincides with the beginning of the US ultimatum to 
Saddam Hussein. Investors might have anticipated that this ultimatum would not be agreed upon which caused 
an early rise in stock market values. 
6 CRS Report for Congress, costs of major US wars, July 2008. 
7 The Gulf War is often also referred to as Second Gulf War or Persian Gulf War. 
8 Although it would be interesting to see how stock markets evolved in the countries were war actually took 
place, this analysis is often not feasible. Either stock exchanges were not yet institutionalized, or controlled by 
the government so that data would not be reliable, or data is not available. 
9 Due to issues of data availability, we could not perform a similar analysis for global wars having occurred ear-
lier in history. 
10 Li and Sacko (2002) find that an unexpected onset of a military dispute reduces bilateral trades more severe-
ly. 
11 This holds true unless we studied intra-day data which in most of these cases is not available. 
12 For simplicity, we normalize the investor’s return for a “peace portfolio“ to one in the case of a peaceful 
resolution. 
